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A. AFRICA
1. Sudan
Darfur, an independent sultanate until 1917, was the last territory to be incorporated
into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Although ethnic lines are unclear due to a long history of
intermarriage, recent distinctions have been made between the indigenous Africans and
Arabs.' Africans primarily compromise the region's agriculturists, the three largest tribes
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1. See Report on the Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, para. 59 at 22 (Jan 25, 2005), available at http://
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-ing-darfur.pdf (describing the coalescing of the "Arab Gathering" and "Af-
rican Belt" during 1980s clashes) [hereinafter UN Comm'n Report].
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being the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masaalit. Darfur's pastoralists are primarily of Arab
descent, herding livestock between north and south Darfur in search of grazing areas and
water sources.
The ethnic groups of Darfur lived in relative peaceful coexistence until environmental
degradation-the Sahel drought and the expanding sands of the Sahara-created compe-
tition for the critical resources of water and arable land. In the mid-1980s, intermittent
disputes erupted over Arab herdsman trampling crops of African farmers or Zaghawa use
of traditionally Arab grazing areas. While these disputes were usually resolved through
tribal administration, a full-scale conflict erupted between the Fur and Arab nomads be-
tween 1987 and 1989. Although an inter-tribal peace conference mediated by the Sultan of
the Masaalit made recommendations for resolution, it did little to address the underlying
dispute over resources. As hostilities intensified, growing regional oil exploration led to
organized interest in property transfer and Sudanese government officials encouraged re-
source disputes.2
On April 25, 2003, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), previously known as the Darfur
Liberation Army, attacked and briefly occupied El Fasher, the capital of the state of North
Darfur. The SLA had declared a state of armed rebellion a few months prior to the El
Fasher occupation. Bringing together the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masaalit, the SLA
called for an end of Khartoum's "policies of marginalization, racial discrimination, exclu-
sion, exploitation, and divisiveness."3 Adopting much of the policy and rhetoric of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of southern Sudan, the SLA promoted an
agenda of inclusiveness by calling for Arab participation and a united democratic Sudan.
The Sudanese government responded with a strategy also utilized against rebels in the
South: air raids followed by attacks by Arab tribesmen armed by the government, the Jan-
jaweed, or evil men on horseback. Unable to call upon a military made up of Darfurians
potentially hesitant to kill their fellow tribesmen, the government turned to Arab tribal
leaders to combat the insurgent African tribes. Musa Hilal, a prominent Arab sheik,
emerged as the leader of the Janjaweed. Arrested in 1997 for killing seventeen Africans in
Darfur, I-Ilal was released from prison to organize the Arab militia.4
Once organized, the Janjaweed unleashed a campaign of terror and, "as tribes were seen
as either 'pro-Salvation' or 'anti-Salvation,' . . . a political and racist agenda emerged."'
More than 170,000 Sudanese fled across the border to neighboring Chad to wait in make-
shift shelters for international aid agencies to transport them to refugee camps away from
the border between Chad and Darfur. This process was hindered by the heavy rains and
floods, which made roads virtually impossible to use. The rain and sandstorms also made
it difficult for aid agencies to reach the refugee camps with vital supplies; overcrowding,
food shortages and outbreaks of disease further worsened the refugee crisis.
2. See id. paras. 67-68 at 24 ("in response to the Government's call [to assist in the fighting against rebels],
mostly Arab nomadic tribes without a traditional homeland and wishing to settle... responded.... In addition,
the Government paid some of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) staff their salaries through tribal leaders,
with State budgets used for these purposes") [citations omitted].
3. The Sudan Liberation Movement& The Sudan Liberation Army, Political Declaration (March 13, 2003),
available at http://www.slme.tk.
4. Emily Wax, In Sudan, 'A Big Sheik' Roams Free: Militia Leader Describes Campaign Against Afrticans as Self
Defense, WAsH. POST, July 18, 2004, at Al.
5. UN Commission Report, supra note 1, para. 216 at 60. 'Salvation' as used in the UN Commission Report
refers to the EI-Bashir 'Salvation' government, the central Government of Sudan.
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Approximately 70,000 displaced persons in Darfur had died as of March 1, 2004.6 Nearly
three million have remained beyond the reach of essential humanitarian assistance,7 and,
out of a total displaced population of 1.45 million, 200,000 displaced persons have fled to
neighboring Chad.' In all, the Janjaweed militia is credited with causing over 300,0009
deaths of Sudanese civilians and displacing an estimated 1.8 million more. 0 The SLA and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), both rebel groups, have alleged that the Su-
danese government, in conjunction with the government-fundedJanjaweed (Arab militias),
economically and politically marginalized black Africans. They also claim that the Arab
militias, with the support of the government, were driving African farmers from their lands,
raping women, and destroying livestock and property in a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Extensive debate erupted in 2004 over whether to call the atrocities in Sudan genocide.
Colin Powell, then the United States Secretary of State, made a determination that there
was sufficient evidence to meet the legal requirements for genocide in Darfur, Sudan. " The
European Union and Canada held to their position that they had insufficient information
to make a determination. Conversely, a European Union (EU) mission sent to Darfur in
August 2004, declared that the humanitarian crisis fell short of genocide. On September 16,
2004, the European Parliament stated that the actions of the Sudanese government in
Darfur were "tantamount to genocide," 2 but has taken little initiative to compel a cessation
of hostilities or even meaningful humanitarian aid to the displaced.
Likewise, the Arab League and the African Union have both concluded that there is no
genocide in Darfur."3 The United Nations concluded that the Sudan government and Jan-
6. David Nabarr, Representative of the World Health Organization Director-General, Presentation on
Health Action in Crises, Mortality Projections for Darfur (Oct. 14, 2004).
7. H.R. Con. Res. 403, 108th Cong. (2004).
8. Sudan: Insecurity Limits Relief Efforts in Darfur, (Jan. 29, 2005), available at http://wwwirinnews.org/
report.aspReportID = 45297 + SelectRegion = EastAfrica&SelectCountry = SUDAN.
9. The figure is 300,000 deaths as opposed to 70,000 deaths as had widely been reported between October
2004 andJanuary 2005. "The figure of 70,000 dead derives from a misreading of a [World Health Organization]
study on [the] mortality rate .... Dr. Nabarro, head of the WHO, ... [stated that he was] only estimating [the]
deaths among the displaced ... and did not include those still living in the countryside, living in the three state
capitals, in camps inaccessible to humanitarian aid, and amongst the refugees in Chad." Jan Coebergh, Sudan:
Genocide has Killed More Than the Tsunami, 9 Parliamentary Brief 7 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.the
politician.org/february05/0205-Main.pdf.
10. U.N. Report: Darfur not Genocide (Jan. 31, 2005), at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/01/
3 1/sudan.report/index.html.
11. See H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133 108th Cong. (2004) (simultaneously
condemning the continuing atrocities in Darfur as "genocide" and seeking international cooperation with the
United States to help bring an end to the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the region). A concurrent
resolution is a legislative proposal that requires the approval of both houses but does not require the signature
of the president and does not have the force of law. Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed executive
consensus on the genocide determination on September 9, 2004 before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Specifically, Powell stated, "We concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur
and that the Government of Sudan and the [Janjaweedl bear responsibility-and that genocide may still be
occurring." The Current Situation in Sudan of the Prospects for Peace: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations,
180th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004) (statement of Sec'y of State Colin Powell), available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042 .htm.
12. Leland Miller & Christian Bock, Again, Never: The EU's Failure to Act in Darfur, 2 J. Eur. Affairs 4
(2004).
13. Duncan Currie, Powell's Darfur Declaration: Why Foggy Bottom took so long to characterize the
Sudanese-and Rwandan-atrocities as "genocide," Weekly Standard, Sept. 15, 2004, available at http://
www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Artices/000/000/00 4/ 6 2 7ismid.
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jaweed had committed war crimes, as opposed to genocide, against the civilian black African
population. Despite the magnitude of death and displacement, it was not until April 2, 2004
that the United Nations Security Council denounced the "massive humanitarian crisis" in
Darfur.'4 A few days later, President Bush first publicly "condemn[ed] these atrocities, which
are displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians."'" The Security Council took action by
adopting Resolution 1547, which requested that parties "use their influence to bring an
immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region."'16
On July 22, 2004, both chambers of the U.S. Congress passed concurrent resolutions
specifically defining the humanitarian crisis in Sudan as "genocide." 7 In contrast, Kofi
Annan, when asked if the atrocities in Sudan amounted to genocide, sidestepped the issue
at his June 25 Press Briefing, replying that "we don't need a label to propel us to act."', On
July 30, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556 stating that the Security
Council would consider further action if the Sudanese government did not disarm and
disband the Janjaweed, take steps to prosecute Janjaweed leaders, and provide full access to
aid agencies and workers. 19 The Sudanese government was largely undeterred by this timid
pledge to consider action, leading the Security Council to pass Resolution 1564 on Sep-
tember 18, 2004.20 Resolution 1564 mostly reiterated Resolution 1556, warning that the
Council would take action if its remonstrations were not heeded and calling for an inde-
pendent commission of inquiry into Darfur.2" As has been the case since the beginning of
this crisis, Khartoum has yet to respond in any material way to the United Nations.
One of the crucial questions to determine the applicability of the rubric "genocide" under
the Genocide Convention is whether the victims can be characterized as a "group." There
are three tribes at question in the Darfur region: Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit. When doc-
umenting the present-day atrocities in Darfur, the State Department described the victim
tribes as non-Arab.2" The victim tribes identify themselves as black as opposed to Arab
Sudanese. There are also language differences. Each of the tribes in the Darfur region
speaks a Nilo-Saharan language as opposed to Arab Sudanese. Historically, the tribes settled
in Darfur before the state of Sudan was established.
In addition, the Genocide Convention enumerates five types of acts of persecution and
destruction to qualify as genocide.2" The accumulated evidence from Darfur indicates that
14. Press Release, Gunter Pleuger, Security Council President, Darfur, Sudan (Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/SC850.doc.htm.
15. Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the United States, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Condemns Atrocities in Sudan (Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/
prin/20040407-2.html.
16. G.A. Res. 1547, U.N. SCOR, 4988th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1547 (2004), available at http://daccess
dds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN?NO4/386/26/PDF/NO438626.pdfOpenElement.
17. See H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133 108th Cong. (2004).
18. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Press Conference in New York (June 25, 2004), at Secretary-General
Off the Cuff,, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/printoffthecuff.asp?nid = 600.
19. G.A. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 5015th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (2004).
20. G.A. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 5040th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 564 (2004).
21. Id.
22. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Bureau of Intelligence & Research,
Documenting Atrocities in Darfltr (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm [herein-
after State Dep't Report 2004].
23. Public Int'l Law & Policy Group, Genocide in Darfur: A LegalAnalysis (Oct. 1, 2004) available at http://
www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID =6727&ThisURL = ./humanrights.asp&URLName = Human%20Rights
[hereinafter Genocide in Darfur).
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the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militia have committed at least four enumer-
ated acts against members of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit tribes: (1) killing members of
the group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (3) delib-
erately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical de-
struction in whole or in part; and (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group.
The killing of black Africans in Dar-fur has been documented by many media sources,
the United Nations, international organizations, and the United States government. Accord-
ing to the State Department report, 61 percent of the black African refugees interviewed
reported seeing a family member killed.2 4 The World Health Organization, as represented
by Jan Coebergh, M.D., estimated that the Janjaweed and the Sudanese Government had
killed 300,000 people in Darfur.2" The documented abuses among Darfur's black African
population included rapes, beatings, ethnic humiliation, and destruction of property. The
State Department recorded that refugees had experienced or witnessed beatings.26 A report
from Amnesty International compiled a list of 250 rape victims from the refugee population
of three Chadian camps. 7 The Amnesty International Report contains witness accounts of
victims raped in public, as well as racially-motivated epithets during attacks, such as "You
blacks, you have spoilt the country! ... We will kill your husbands and sons and sleep with
you! You will be our wives!" 28 These crimes constitute serious mental harm under the
Genocide Convention.
The State Department further found that more than 405 villages in Darfur had been
completely destroyed, with an additional 123 substantially damaged, since February 2003.19
The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that there
were 1.2 million civilians internally displaced in Sudan or in refugee camps in Chad because
of forced expulsion from their homes and fear of attacks from militia or government forces.3°
In Darfur, Janjaweed militia has allegedly used rape as a measure to prevent the births
of black Africans' children. Amnesty International's report identified 250 rape victims and
discovered evidence of an additional 250 cases of rape in three refugee camps in Chad.3
The Washington Post reported in June 2004 that, according to interviews of two dozen
women in camps in West Darfur, Arab militiamen were raping women so that they would
bear Arab children.32
2. Angola
In the oil-rich Cabinda region, which produces 60 percent of Angola's oil revenue, the
Angolan Army faced allegations that it had been engaging in acts of torture, arbitrary
arrests, sexual mistreatment, and detention of local citizens. Since 2002, 30,000 Angolan
24. State Dep't Report 2004, supra note 22.
25. Coebergh, supra note 9.
26. State Dep't Report 2004, supra note 22.
27. Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its consequences (Jan. 19, 2004),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr540762004.
28. Id.
29. State Dep't Report 2004, supra note 22.
30. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Fact Sbeet: Humanitarian Assistancefor Darfur,
Sudan, (Jun. 24, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/humanassist.htm.
31. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 27.
32. Genocide in Darfur, supra note 23.
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troops have been stationed in the region. In addition, the Angolan government continues
to restrict freedom of the press and other civil liberties. These acts of violence and restric-
tions occur as Angola prepares to hold national elections in 2006 for the first time since
the end of the country's twenty-seven year old civil war."
3. Nigeria
The Niger Delta Region was the scene of ongoing violence due to conflicts stemming
from the ownership interests of the region's oil reserves. According to recent reports, rep-
resentatives from Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, (NDPVF) threatened to launch
an all out war to gain greater control of the region's oil resources. 4 Nigerian government
troops have been deployed to the region to stem the growing violence. The recent wave of
violence in the region disrupted production by multinational petroleum producers due to
security concerns and also created additional instability in markets which helped to push
crude oil prices above the fifty dollar a barrel mark.35
B. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
1. The International Criminal Tribunals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
For the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the year 2004 marked the
tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the introduction of a new Prosecutor, and
unrest amongst the defense. At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY), the Slobodan Milosevic case proceeded slowly but surely and the Prose-
cutor scuffled with Serbia and Montenegro. As the end of their mandates drew near, both
Tribunals laid the groundwork for the eventual transfer of cases to national jurisdictions.
In the meantime, both international war crimes tribunals struggled to comply with the
completion strategy. This completion plan, promulgated by the Security Council, requires
Tribunal investigations and indictments to end by 2004, trials by 2008, and appeals by
2010.36
a. ICTY
In his address to the U.N. Security Council, ICTY President Theodor Meron remained
largely optimistic about compliance with the completion strategy, although he cautioned
that it must remain flexible to allow for prosecution of high-ranking leaders such as Radovan
Karadzic (former Bosnian Serb leader), Ratko Mladic (former chief of the Bosnian Serb
army), and Ante Gotovina (Croatian military leader). As part of its efforts to comply with
the completion strategy, the ICTY began to transfer cases of lower-ranking defendants to
the national courts of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. However, President
Meron reiterated to the Security Council that the tribunals must first be satisfied that
33. Human Rights Watch, Angola: In Oil-Rich Cabinda, Army Abuses Civilians (Dec. 23, 2004), available
at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/23/angola992 2-txt.htm.
34. Human Rights Watch, Violence in Nigeria's Oil Rich Rivers State in 2004: Summary, available at http://
hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/nigeria02O5/l .htn.
35. Id.
36. The ICTY was established by a U.N. Security Council resolution in 1993, the ICTR by a similar Security
Council resolution in 1995. See United Nations, Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, available at http://www.
un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm; United Nations, ICTR-General Information, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htn.
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international trial and detention standards are met and that the death penalty will not be
applied before transferring cases.
Both Meron and the ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte expressed frustration with budget
restrictions due to arrears in payments by member states. These restrictions have resulted
in the loss of key personnel and the inability to recruit replacements, making it difficult to
comply with the completion strategy.
The ICTY accused the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro of non-cooperation. In
May, President Meron reported to the Security Council that Belgrade failed to execute
arrest warrants, secure witness testimony, secure documentary evidence, or grant waivers
enabling witnesses to testify. These failures by Belgrade constituted a breach of its obliga-
tions to the ICTY.
37
In a July press release, Prosecutor Del Ponte expressed outrage over an ICTY indictee
having been "tipped off" to his planned arrest, presumably by the authorities, which drove
him into hiding. Del Ponte urged Belgrade to follow through with its pro-ICTY rhetoric,
threatening to ask President Meron once again to report the country's non-cooperation to
the Security Council if they did not comply.
Three new trials before the ICTY began in 2004. The first, beginning in February, was
that of Momcilo Krajisnik, a Bosnian Serb political leader.3 8 The second, beginning in
October, was that of Naser Oric, the controversial Bosnian Muslim commander of Sre-
brenica.39 The third, beginning in November, was the consolidated trial of Fatmir Limaj,
Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu, alleged members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).40
Six indicted Bosnian Croat defendants gave their initial appearance in April, pleading not
guilty to the charges against them. The ICTY also accepted a guilty plea by Milan Babic,
a former Croatian Serb political leader, and sentenced him to thirteen years imprisonment.
41
The defendant in Prosecutor v. Cesic42 pled guilty to all charges against him. Cesic, a
Bosnian Serb policeman, was charged with having tortured, raped, and killed Bosnian Mus-
lim prisoners at detention facilities. In light of his particularly horrific crimes, the Trial
Chamber imposed the Prosecutor's maximum recommended sentence, sentencing him to
eighteen years imprisonment.
Trial Chamber I also issued a judgment in the case of Miodrag Jokic, a former Yugoslav
navy admiral charged for his participation in the shelling of the historic old town of Du-
brovnik, Croatia. 43 CitingJokic's remorse, the fact that he had turned himself over to the
Tribunal voluntarily, and his guilty plea, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to only seven
years imprisonment. A controversial sentence was handed down for Miroslav Deronjic, a
Bosnian Serb political leader who ordered the attack on Bosnian Muslims in Glogova,
Bosnia. 4 The Prosecutor recommended a sentence of just ten years for Deronjic in con-
sideration of his guilty plea, and also because he had cooperated significantly by testifying
37. Letter from Theodor Meron, President of the ICTY, to the President of the U.N. Security Council
(May 4, 2004), available at www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p840e-htn.
38. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, ICTY IT-OO-39 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
39. Prosecutor v. Oric, ICTY IT-03-68 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
40. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, and Isak, ICTY IT-03-66 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
41. Prosecutor v. Babic, ICTY IT-03-72 (Jun. 29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
42. Prosecutor v. Cesic, ICTY IT 95-10/1 (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
43. Prosecutor v. Jokic, ICTY IT 01-42/1 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
44. Prosecutor v. Deronjic, ICTY IT-02-61 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
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in other trials. The Trial Chamber accepted the Prosecutor's recommendation. However,
Judge Schomburg issued a scathing dissent, arguing that Deronjic's sentence was much too
lenient. Trial Chamber I also handed down a sentence for Darko Mrdja, a former Bosnian
Serb police officer charged for his involvement in the murder of approximately 200 civilians
at Vlasic Mountain, Bosnia. 41 Mrdja pled guilty and was sentenced to seventeen years
imprisonment.
In September 2004, Trial Chamber II delivered a thirty-two-year sentence in the case of
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin.46 Brdjanin was a Bosnian Serb political leader who held power in
northwest Bosnia, where some of the most notorious detention camps existed. The Cham-
ber dismissed the genocide charges against Brdjanin, but convicted him of crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and violations of the laws or customs
of war.
The trial date of Slobodan Milosevic, the first-ever sitting head of state to be indicted
by an international court, was repeatedly postponed due to the ill health of the defendant,
who was suffering from exhaustion. The Prosecution's case concluded on February 25,
2004, two years after it commenced. In March, PresidingJudge Richard May stepped down
from the trial due to an undisclosed illness and was replaced by Lord lain Bonomy. Un-
fortunately, Judge May passed away from his illness last July.
In June, the Trial Chamber issued its decision on the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
filed by Milosevic's amici curiae.47 Although the Chamber dismissed most of the motion,
it held that certain accusations pertaining to Bosnia failed due to insufficient evidence.
Following more delays, the defense case began at the end of August 2004, with Milosevic
delivering the opening statement. After hearing motions from both sides, the Trial Chamber
instructed the registrar to appoint counsel over the defendant's objections, citing trial delays
and Milosevic's ill health. In September, David Kay QC and his assistant Gillian Higgins,
both of whom served as Milosevic's amicus curiae and have represented other ICTY and
ICTR defendants, were appointed as defense counsel. This appointment came despite their
warnings that the denial of Milosevic's right to self-representation could constitute signifi-
cant grounds for appeal. The Appeals Chamber subsequently issued a decision affirming
the appointment of counsel, subject to the condition that Milosevic be allowed to take the
lead in defending himself when physically able to do so.41 The Trial Chamber later denied
Mr. Kay and Ms. Higgins' motion to withdraw, which was based on Milosevic's refusal to
communicate with them.
The Appeals Chamber issued its decision in Prosecutor v. Krstic in 2004.49 Krstic was a
General-Major in the Bosnian Serb Army and Commander of the Drina Corps during the
takeover of the U.N. safe area of Srebrenica. In its decision, the Appeals Chamber unani-
mously held that genocide took place at Srebrenica, marking the first time since the Nu-
remberg trials that an international court has officially recognized genocide on European
soil. However, the Appeals Chamber held that Krstic was an aider and abettor of genocide
rather than a member of a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide. Thus, the Chamber
reduced his sentence from forty-six years of imprisonment to thirty-five.
45. Prosecutor v. Mrdja, ICTY IT-02-59 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
46. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, ICTY IT-99-36 (Sept. 1, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
47. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY IT-02-54 (Jun. 16, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
48. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY IT-02-54 (Novi, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
49. Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY IT-98-33 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
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In Prosecutor v. Blaskic,5 0 the case of a former commander of the Croatian Defense Council
in central Bosnia, the Appeals Chamber reversed most of the counts on which Blaskic was
originally convicted and dramatically reduced his sentence from forty-five years to nine.
Much of the reason for this turn-around is that the court received an enormous amount of
new evidence late due to Croatia's initial refusal to open the national archives. The ICTY
allows introduction of new evidence on appeal. The Appeals Chamber said the new evidence
"fatally undermine[d]" the Trial Chamber's conclusions and it therefore imposed a new
sentence."
In Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, 2 the Appeals Chamber disagreed with the mode of liability
imposed by the Trial Chamber on the defendant, a Serb paramilitary leader, for persecution,
a crime against humanity, murder, and a violation of the laws or customs of war. Holding
that Vasiljevic was merely an aider and abettor rather than a co-perpetrator, the Appeals
Chamber reduced his sentence from twenty years of imprisonment to fifteen.
In Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, 3 the Chamber upheld nearly all counts against Bosnian
Croat politician Dario Kordic while overturning the bulk of charges against Bosnian Croat
commander Mario Cerkez. The Appeals Chamber upheld Kordic's twenty-five-year sen-
tence and reduced Cerkez's sentence from fifteen years to six.
b. ICTR
Since 1999, Carla Del Ponte had served as the Prosecutor of both the ICTR and the
ICTY In December 2003, in an effort to further the completion strategy, the Security
Council appointed a new Prosecutor to the ICTR, Gambian Judge Hassan Bubacar Jallow.
Like the ICTY, the ICTR also had struggled to comply with the completion strategy under
the burden of a heavy caseload. Although the ICTR managed to complete all investigations
in 2004, it was unable to submit all indictments by the end of 2004, thus putting it behind
schedule. The Prosecutor noted that part of the reason for the Tribunal's backlog was that,
unlike the ICTY, very few ICTR defendants have pled guilty.
The ICTR also took steps to transfer cases of lower-ranking officials to Rwanda and
other national jurisdictions. Currently, Jallow plans to transfer the cases of five of the eigh-
teen detainees awaiting trial. He stressed that international fair trial standards must be met
as a precondition to transfer and that the ICTR should retain the ability to try high-ranking
officials that are not yet in the Tribunal's custody. These include Felicien Kabuga, the Hutu
owner of a private media outlet that advocated mass murder of Tutsis.
Several discussions were held in 2004 in an effort to reach an agreement between the
United Nations and the Rwandan Government regarding the enforcement of ICTR sen-
tences in Rwanda. Defense lawyers and accused persons have spoken out vehemently against
this plan to transfer sentences and possibly cases, arguing that defendants will receive a
victor's justice in Rwanda.
In March, the ICTR heard opening arguments in Prosecutor v. Muhimana.54 Muhimana,
the former councilor of Gishyita sector in Kibuye, has been charged with participating in
50. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ICTY IT-95-14 (Jul. 29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
51. Id. at para. 339.
52. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, ICTY 98-32 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
53. Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, ICTY 95-14/2 (Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
54. Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR 95-1-1 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
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the massacre of thousands of victims at several locations in Kibuye, along with personally
raping and killing Tutsis. In May, Presiding Judge Andresia Vaz withdrew from the case of
Prosecutor v. Karemerall following repeated allegations of bias by the defense. August marked
the start of the trial of Aloys Simba, a former Rwandan army officer charged with genocide
and crimes against humanity in connection with massacres in two provinces in southern
Rwanda1 6
Two new trials began in September. The first was the high-profile Military 11 trial. The
defendants, four senior-ranking military officials, have been charged with genocide, crimes
against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The second was the trial
of the first Catholic priest to appear before the Tribunal: Father Athanase Seromba.2 Ser-
omba is charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in connection with the mas-
sacres of thousands of Tutsi refugees in Kibuye. The trial was temporarily postponed after
forty-three accused persons began a three-day protest against proposals to move the cases
to Rwanda.
In January 2004, Trial Chamber 11 handed down a life sentence for Jean de Dieu Ka-
muhanda, former Rwandan Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, finding
him guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity."8 In the joint trial of Samuel Imanish-
imwe, Andr6 Ntagerura, and Emmanuel Bagambiki, Trial Chamber IlI sentenced Samuel
Imanishimwe, former military commander in the Rwanda armed forces, to twenty-seven
years imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Ge-
neva Convention; however, they acquitted Ntagerura, former Minister of Transport and
Communications, and Bagambiki, the former Prefect of Cyangugu, of similar charges, cit-
ing insufficient evidence.5 9
Former Rwandan mayor Sylvestre Gacumbitsi was sentenced to thirty years imprison-
ment for genocide and crimes against humanity.6° Among other incidents, Gacumbitsi or-
dered the massacre of Tutsis in Nyarubuye church, personally killed Tutsis himself, and
incited Hutus to kill and rape Tutsis.
In July, Trial Chamber I sentenced Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, former Minister of Finance
in the Interim Government of Rwanda, to life imprisonment.6' According to the judgment,
the defendant committed genocide and crimes against humanity when he urged attackers
to kill thousands of Tutsi assembled at Gitwa Hill, distributed machetes and grenades, and
transported armed attackers to the site.
In Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka,62 the Appeals Chamber dismissed the defendant's appeal in its
entirety, upholding the life sentence previously imposed by the Trial Chamber. Niyitegeka
was Minister of Information of Rwanda's Interim Government in 1994. He was found to
have procured gendarmes for an attack on Tutsis hiding inside Mubuga Church, led armed
attackers in two attacks on Tutsi refugees at Muyira Hill, and incited extermination of
Tutsis.
55. Prosecutor v. Karemera, ICTR 98-44 (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
56. Prosecutor v. Simba, ICTR 01-76 (Aug. 30, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
57. Prosecutor v. Seromba, ICTR 2001-66-I (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
58. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, ICTR 99-54 (Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
59. Prosecutor v. Imanishimwe, ICTR 97-36 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
60. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, ICTR 2001-64 (Jun. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
61. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, ICTR 07-71-I (Jul. 15, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
62. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, ICTR 96-14 (Jul. 9, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
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The Appeals Chamber also upheld the convictions of a senior Pastor of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church in Mugonero, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, and his son Dr. Grard Ntak-
irutimana, a medical practitioner. The defendants had been sentenced to terms of ten and
twenty-five years respectively, for genocide and crimes against humanity.6
3
In January 2004, the ICTR's defense lawyers went on a three-day strike to protest a
"serious deterioration" in the rights of the accused.- Specifically, the lawyers and detainees
protested the inability of defense investigators to be present when the prosecution presents
evidence and the rejection and curtailment of some work programs proposed by defense
lawyers. They also resented the need to account extensively for their work and submit to
excessive security checks upon entry to the U.N. Detention Facility where their clients are
held. Some of these problems have been attributed to the Tribunal's quickening pace in
order to comply with the completion strategy. The strike was suspended after the defense
lawyers received assurances from the Tribunal's registry that some of their demands would
be met.
2. Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court) was established in Freetown, Sierra
Leone pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the Government
of Sierra Leone, concluded on January 16, 2002.6 The Special Court has jurisdiction to
prosecute persons who "bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since 30 November 1996."66 Since operations began in July 2002, the three organs of the
Special Court, the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry (including the
Defence Office), have grown to over 300 local and international personnel.
67
March 2004 marked the appointment of the Special Court Principal Defender.68 This is
an innovative and unique position amongst international criminal tribunals. It was created
to counterbalance the Prosecutor and ensure the principle of the equality of arms. As de-
fined in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court,69 the Principal Defender
heads the Defence Office, which provides advice, assistance, and representation to suspects
and accused.
In May 2004, Justice Emmanuel Ayoola (Nigeria) was elected as the new President of
the Special Court. He replaced Justice Geoffrey Robertson, who was President from De-
cember 2002 until March 2004, and Justice Renate Winter, who was Acting President from
March 2004 to May 2004.
63. Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR 96- 10 & 96-17 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org.
64. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network for Central
and Eastern Africa, Weekly Round-up for Jan. 24-30, 2004, available at http://www.cidi.org/humanitarian/irin/
ceafrica/04a/ixl4.html.
65. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 139.
66. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1(1) (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.
sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html [hereinafter Special Court Statute].
67. Emmanuel Olayinka Ayoola, President of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Briefing to the U.N.
Security Council (May 24, 2005).
68. Prior to the Principal Defender's appointment, the post was filled by an Acting Principal Defender.
69. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule 45 (May 29, 2004), available
at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-procedure.html [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
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There are currently eleven accused before the Special Court,70 nine of whom are in
custody at the Special Court's Detention Facility. The remaining two are former Liberian
President Charles Taylor, who was granted asylum by the Government of Nigeria in Au-
gust 2003,"' and Johnny Paul Koroma, who remains at large. Under its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the Special Court may request Nigeria to arrest and transfer Taylor to the
Special Court but cannot compel Nigeria to do so.72 Such a request was formally transmitted
to the relevant Nigerian authorities in late 2003. Interpol "Red Notices" were also issued
against Taylor and Koroma in December 2003 and October 2004, respectively."3
In January 2004, the Trial Chamber issued a decision ordering the joint trial of Issa
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao of the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), and a separate joint trial of Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie
Borbor Kanu of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).14 The Trial Chamber
also ordered the joint trial of Samuel Hinga Norman, Allieu Kondewa, and Moinina Fofana
of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).75 Until Charles Taylor and Johnny Paul Koroma are
brought before the Special Court, there are three active cases pending before the Trial
Chamber. Trials for two of these cases began inJune 2004 andJuly 2004, respectively. Since
then, the Trial Chamber has continued to hear both cases, alternating on a monthly basis.
Notably, almost all witnesses who have testified to date have done so under some form of
protective measures to ensure their privacy and security. 6
a. Jurisdiction
Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber issued a number of decisions and
orders in 2004. These include several key decisions issued by the Appeals Chamber on
preliminary motions relating to the jurisdiction of the Special Court.77 In March 2004, a
three-member panel of the Appeals Chamber issued a unanimous decision finding that the
amnesty granted under the Lom6 Peace Agreement (Lom6 Agreement) does not bar the
prosecution of an accused for international crimes which were committed beforeJuly 1999,
70. To date, a total of thirteen accused have been indicted by the Prosecutor. However, in December 2003,
the indictments against Foday Saybana Sankoh and Sam Bockarie were withdrawn as a result of their deaths.
The Prosecutor has indicated the possibility that additional indictments may be issued. See About the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.sc-sl.org/about.html.
71. Open Society Justice Initiative, Charles Taylor's Asylum in Nigeria, available at http://www.justice
initiative.org/activities (last visited Jul. 20, 2005).
72. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 69 at Rule 58.
73. Press Release, Interpol, Interpol issues Red Notice for former Liberian President (Dec. 4,2003), available
at http://www.interpol.int; Press Release, Special Court of Sierra Leone, Interpol Discloses Red Notice for
Johnny Paul Koroma (Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.
74. Prosecutor v. Sesay, et al, SCSL-2003-05-PT-096 (Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.The
Prosecutor subsequently requested leave to file an interlocutory appeal against this decision, but the application
was denied by the Trial Chamber. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, SCSL-2004-15-PT-014 (Feb. 13,
2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org. Updated information about these cases is available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
2005.
75. Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-2003-08-PT; Prosecutor v. Fofana, SCSL-2003-11-PT; Prosecutor v.
Kondewa, SCSL-2003-12 (Jan. 27, 2004).
76. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 69 at Rule 75.
77. Under the Special Court's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, preliminary motions which "raise a serious
issue relating to jurisdiction shall be referred to a bench of at least three Appeals Chamber judges." Id. at Rule
72(E).
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when the Lom6 Agreement was signed.78 The decision followed motions filed by Morris
Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara asserting that the Government of Sierra Leone was bound
to observe the amnesty granted under the Lom6 Agreement and that the Special Court
could not exercise jurisdiction over any crimes committed before the Agreement was signed.
The Appeals Chamber found that the Lom6 Agreement was not a treaty and that the
rights and obligations it created are to be regulated by the domestic laws of Sierra Leone.
As a result, whether it is binding on the Government of Sierra Leone does not affect the
liability of the accused to be prosecuted in an international tribunal for international crimes.
The Appeals Chamber also validated Article 10 of the Special Court's Statute which ex-
plicitly provides that amnesty granted to any person for international crimes shall not bar
prosecution. The Chamber found this provision to be "an express statutory limitation on
the discretion of the Court to decline jurisdiction on the sole ground that amnesty had
been granted to a defendant."7 9 The Appeals Chamber concluded that any undertaking by
the Sierra Leonean government to grant amnesty cannot affect the independent judgment
of the Prosecutor to indict and prosecute any accused since the Prosecutor is not responsible
to the Sierra Leonean government.
In May 2004, a three-member panel of the Appeals Chamber issued a unanimous decision
on Charles Taylor's application to quash the indictment against him and set aside the arrest
warrant on the grounds that he enjoys absolute immunity from criminal prosecution as an
incumbent Head of State at the time of his indictment.8 0 The Appeals Chamber first ex-
amined Article 6(2) of the Special Court's Statute, which provides that "the official position
of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Gov-
ernment official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment."81 It reasoned that the Special Court cannot "ignore whatever the Statute
directs or permits or empowers it to do unless such provisions are void as being in conflict
with a peremptory norm of general international law."82 The Appeals Chamber found that
similar provisions were incorporated into the Statutes of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter).
The Appeals Chamber then turned to the judgment of the International Court ofJustice
in the case of Congo v. Belguim. In that judgment, the International Court of Justice had
upheld immunities in national courts for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but also
held that incumbent or former government officials could be subject to criminal proceed-
ings before international criminal such as the ICTY, ICTR and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Special Court is likewise an inter-
national criminal court with "all that implies for the question of immunity for a serving
Head of State."83 In particular, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Special Court is not
part of the Sierra Leonean judiciary and not a national court; that the Special Court is
established by treaty and has the characteristics associated with classical international or-
78. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, SCSL-2004-PT-060 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.
79. Id. at para. 87.
80. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-1-059 (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.
81. Special Court Statute, supra note 66, at Art. 6 (2).
82. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I-059 at para. 43.
83. Id. at para. 41(d).
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ganizations; and that the competence and jurisdiction of the Special Court are broadly
similar to that of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC.
b. Recruitment of Child Soldiers
In May 2004, a four-member panel of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court held,
in a majority decision, that the recruitment of child soldiers, as defined in article 4 of the
Special Court's Statute, was recognized as a crime entailing individual criminal responsi-
bility under customary international law during the period of the Special Court's temporal
jurisdiction, as of November 1996.84 The decision was in response to a motion by Sam
Hinga Norman that the Special Court has no jurisdiction to try him for the recruitment
of child soldiers, as it was not a crime under customary international law at the time of the
acts alleged in the indictment against him. The University of Toronto International Human
Rights Clinic and UNICEF submitted amicus briefs.
First, the Appeals Chamber found that the prohibition on child recruitment had crys-
tallized as customary law prior to 1996. The Appeals Chamber noted that this prohibition
was widely recognized and accepted by November 1996, as reflected in such legal instru-
ments as the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Second, the
Appeals Chamber found that, by November 1996, the prohibition on child recruitment
entailed individual criminal responsibility. The Appeals Chamber noted that the protection
of children is one of the fundamental guarantees articulated in Additional Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions and reflected in the Special Court's Statute, and that various
human rights organizations have reported the "atrocious consequences" for children re-
cruited to participate in armed hostilities." According to the Appeals Chamber, such serious
violations of fundamental guarantees lead to individual criminal responsibility.6 It con-
cluded that a norm did not need to be expressly stated in an international convention to
constitute a crime under customary international law, and further, that the individual crim-
inal responsibility of an accused did not need to be explicitly stated in a convention for
individual criminal responsibility to be invoked under customary international law.87
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Geoffrey Robertson found that the prohibition on child
recruitment did not become a rule of international criminal law until July 1998, when the
Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted.18 In his view, the state of international law in No-
vember 1996 with respect to child recruitment was unclear "to the Secretary-General."89
Justice Robertson therefore concluded that the applicant could not be prosecuted for any
offence of child recruitment which was allegedly committed before July 1998. 9o
c. Judicial Bias
Issa Hassan Sesay, one of the CDF accused, filed a motion in February 2004 seeking the
disqualification of Justice Geoffrey Robertson from the Appeals Chamber on the grounds
that the Judge has expressed "the clearest and most grave bias" against the RUF in portions
84. Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-14-AR72(E) (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.
85. Id. at para. 29.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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of Justice Robertson's 2002 book entitled "Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for
Global Justice."' In response to the motion, the Prosecution agreed that "there could be
a valid argument that there is an appearance of bias on the part of Judge Robertson" and
that "the material could lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to apprehend bias."92
In March 2004, the remaining members of the Appeals Chamber issued a decision finding
"no doubt that a reasonable man will apprehend bias, let alone an accused person."93 They
emphasized that judges must be above suspicion of bias and that the presumption of in-
nocence must be respected until guilt is proved. 94 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber or-
dered, pursuant to Rule 15(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, that Justice Rob-
ertson be disqualified from adjudicating any matters involving any alleged members of the
RUF or the RUF generally.9
In May 2004, the Appeals Chamber issued a second decision 96 relating to judicial bias,
this time in response to a motion by Sam Hinga Norman seeking the withdrawal ofJustice
Renate Winter from deliberating whether the recruitment of child soldiers amounted to a
crime under customary international law at the time of his indictment.97 In his motion,
Norman claimed that Justice Winter had pre-judged the issue due to her involvement with
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and her participation in a masters program
in children's rights run by the University of Freiburg.9" Norman further argued thatJustice
Winter's apparent refusal to explain her relationship with UNICEF despite repeated re-
quests by his defense counsel left "no other rational inference but that the relationship is
very extensive indeed." 99
A three-member panel of the Appeals Chamber found that Justice Winter's review of a
UNICEF publication, which dealt with the Special Court and its jurisdiction to prosecute
the conscription or enlistment of children, did not suggest the judge had approved the
publication, and no "reasonable observer properly informed of the professional practice of
reviewing publications would reasonably apprehend bias."100 The Appeals Chamber also
held that a history of professional association, such as between Justice Winter and the
masters program in children's rights, did not show or even suggest an appearance of bias.'
0
'
In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber found that Norman's arguments were evidence of
Justice Winter's internationally recognized qualifications in the field of juvenile justice
rather than any actual or perceived bias on the question of whether the recruitment of child
soldiers is a crime under customary international law.Ioz
91. Prosecutor v. Sesay, SCSL-04-15-AR-15 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org. See also
Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (2d ed. 2003).
92. Prosecutorv. Sesay, SCSL-2004-15-AR-15, at para. 7.
93. Prosecutorv. Sesay, SCSL-2004-15-AR-15 at para. 15.
94. Id. at para. 16.
95. Id. at para. 18.
96. Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org.
97. Id.
98. Id. at paras. 2-4.
99. Id. at para. 8.
100. Id. at para. 27.
101. Id. at para. 28.
102. Id. at para. 30.
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II. Imprisomnent & Punishment
A. THE DEATH PENALTY
1. The United States
The U.S. Supreme Court was very active in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in 2004;
it reviewed several cases challenging the death penalty on a myriad of procedural and sub-
stantive grounds. Bedrock legal principles and standards under the Eighth (and also the
Fourth and Fourteenth) Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are percolating through
several pending habeas corpus and other cases concerning the status of prisoners and de-
tainees and the conditions of their confinement in the United States, Guant~namo and
elsewhere. 1°5 Also, international human rights law and judicial decisions continue to be cited
as relevant legal authority for U.S. courts to consider in these cases.
In 2003, sixty-five persons were executed in the United States; 1°4 in 2004, fifty-eight
persons were executedlos Although the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment does not bar the death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to address
challenges to its application. In 2004, the Supreme Court considered four cases arising out
of either the Fifth Circuit (which includes Texas) or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.I°6
In Banks v. Dretke,1°7 the Supreme Court overturned a Texas inmate's death sentence im-
posed by the Fifth Circuit because the prosecution deliberately withheld evidence that
would have made jurors less likely to impose the death penalty. In Tennard v. Dretke,1° the
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that a certificate of appealability (COA)
mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 10 9 should be issued in this
Eighth Amendment death penalty case because the extremely low IQ of the defendant was
relevant to death penalty jury instructions. In Smith v. Texas," l0 the Court reversed the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals because of unconstitutional jury instructions regarding miti-
gation, which precluded imposition of a death sentence. In Miller-El v. Dretke, "' the Court
agreed to decide for the second time whether the Fifth Circuit properly considered evidence
that prosecutors had deliberately excluded African-Americans from the jury.
103. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush,542 U.S. 466 (2004); and Rumsfe v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004) (the trilogy of War on Terrorism cases which have opened the federal courts to consid-
eration potentially of a full spectrum of legal claims based on both U.S. law and international human rights
law). With respect to the subject of U.S. prison abuse see, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Mistreatment of Prisoners Is Called
Routine in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004 at Al (prison torture and abuse are circumscribed by the Eighth
Amendment and possibly also subject to international law scrutiny); Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America,
Abu Ghraib and the War on Terror (2004) (a documented chronology of how a culture of acceptance of torture
developed post-September 11, perhaps a devolution of societal standards which may become relevant in future
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
104. DeWayne Wickham, U.S. sets poor example when it comes to death penalty, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 2004, at
13A.
105. See John Ritter, Death Penalty Uneven Across USA, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 2004, at 3A.
106. Noteworthy recent Supreme Court decisions also include, inter alia, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S.
101 (2003) (death penalty imposed on retrial neither violates any liberty interest nor constitutes double jeop-
ardy) and Atkins v. rirginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional).
107. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
108. 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
109. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2003).
110. 125 S.Ct. 400 (2004) (per curiam).
111. 125S.Ct. 2317(2004).
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In Nelson v. Campbell,l"2 the Court unanimously held that an Alabama convict could
pursue an appeal claiming a "cut-down" incision procedure prior to lethal injection violates
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Nelson was the latest of
several cases challenging the means of carrying out a death sentence which include lethal
injections, hangings, electrocution, gas chambers and firing squads. The Court determined
that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserting the Eighth Amendment violation was not the
equivalent of a second or successive habeas application subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)'s
gatekeeping requirements."3 Justice O'Connor's opinion explained that a Section 1983
claim must yield to the federal habeas corpus statute when an inmate seeks injunctive relief
challenging the conviction or the duration of a sentence. 14 However, constitutional claims
challenging the conditions of confinement are cognizable under Section 1983." l' The
Court, however, did not determine how the "cut-down" procedure should be classified and
noted that a Section 1983 claim does not mandate a stay of execution and does not trump
the procedural and substantive limitations of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.ll6
The Supreme Court examined effectiveness standards for attorneys in death penalty cases
in Florida v. Nixon." 7 It held that counsel's failure to obtain his client's express consent to
a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital case was not deficient representation per se.' s
During opening arguments, defense counsel acknowledged Nixon's guilt for a brutal mur-
der, but both then and at closing argument sought to persuade the jury that Nixon should
not be sentenced to death. 119 During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented expert
testimony that Nixon had a prominent history of psychiatric care, a low IQ, and possible
brain damage. 120 The jury recommended the death penalty, which the trial court imposed.' 2'
Applying the objective standards of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington,'22
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court (Rehnquist, CJ., not participating), found
that counsel's strategy was reasonable. 123 Consequently, the Court reversed the contrary
decision of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded.
2 4
Two other death sentence decisions issued June 24, 2004, reflect the Court's five to four
split on many such challenges. In Beard v. Banks, 12 Justice Thomas (writing for a majority
including Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) reversed the Third Circuit and held
that Mills v. Maryland'26 and McKoy v. North Carolina27 announced new rules of constitu-
112. 541 U.S. 637 (2004).
113. Id. at 642.
114. Id. at 643.
115. Id.
116. Future developments in this case may prove relevant to the swirl of pending legal proceedings arising
out of the alleged use of torture on War on Terror detainees at Guantinamo, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.
117. 125 S.Ct. 551 (2004).
118. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (expressing the Supreme Court's willingness to meaningfully
examine ineffective assistance of counsel defense to execution when mitigation evidence, such as a low IQ, was
not argued).
119. Nixon, 125 S.Ct. at 558.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
123. Nixon, 125 S.Ct. at 563.
124. Id.
125. 542 U.S. 406 (2004).
126. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
127. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
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tional criminal procedure invalidating capital sentencing schemes which required juries to
disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously.12 8 Habeas corpus relief was not avail-
able because the new rules in Mills and McKoy did not fall within specific exceptions to non-
retroactivity previously set forth in Teague v. Lane.2 9 Consequently, the murder conviction
and death sentence upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must be reinstated. In
Schriro v. Summerlin,"1° the same majority, led by Justice Scalia, reversed the Ninth Circuit
and determined that Ring v. Arizona, ' which required that the existence of an aggravating
factor be proved to a jury rather than a judge, did not apply retroactively because Ring was
properly classified as a procedural ruling and did not announce a watershed rule of universal
procedure.
In Roper v. Simmons,'32 the Supreme Court agreed to revisit the issue of whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for crimes committed at the age of sixteen
or seventeen.' 3' An amicus brief was filed by former PresidentJimmy Carter, former Soviet
Union President Mikhail Gorbachev and other Nobel Peace Prize winners. Additional amici
submissions were filed by, inter alia, the forty-five member Council of Europe, forty-eight
nations, the American Medical Association, thirty religious groups and the American Bar
Association, which all condemned the practice. The State of Missouri argued that nineteen
states allow the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and thirteen states have ju-
veniles awaiting executions." 4 The Supreme Court had two fundamental issues to address
in Roper: (1) once the Supreme Court determines that a particular form of punishment is
not cruel and unusual, whether a lower court can subsequently determine that it has become
so, based on evolving societal standards; and (2) whether imposition of the death penalty
on a person who commits a murder at age seventeen constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment, as barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The United States is one of only two countries (the other is Iran) that continues to execute
juvenile offenders.' Several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International,
issued public statements in August 2004, expressing outrage at the public hanging in Iran
of an allegedly mentally incompetent sixteen-year-old girl for acts incompatible with chas-
tity. The United States is also one of only two countries (the other is Somalia, which lacks
a central government) that have refused to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the most universally accepted human rights instrument in history.
On March 31, 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Avena case, ordered
U.S. courts to review death sentences imposed on fifty-one Mexican nationals due to re-
peated violations of the prisoners' rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention to
speak with Mexican consular officials. 13 6 Previously, in the LaGrand case,'37 the ICJ held
128. In contrast, Court decisions which announce new substantive rules generally do not apply retroactively.
129. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
130. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
131. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
132. 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
133. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding statutes under which the minimum age for
capital punishment is sixteen).
134. See David Stout, Dozens of Nations Weigh In a Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TiMES, July 20, 2004, at A12;see
also Ann Gearan, Supreme Court Lobbied to Halt Juvenile Executions, WASH. PosT, July 19, 2004, at 1.
135. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty & International Law, 52 DuiE L. REv. 485 (2002).
136. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S), 2004 I.CJ. I (Mar. 31, 2004).
137. LaGrand (E.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.CJ. 466 (Jun. 27, 2001).
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that procedural default rules cannot bar review of a petitioner's claim-a ruling adhered
to in Avena.
The en banc Sixth Circuit, in House v. Bell, 13 voted eight to seven to deny a writ of habeas
corpus and to condemn Paul Gregory House to death despite post-conviction DNA and
other evidence which might have proven his actual innocence. 39 All Republican appointees
voted in the majority and all Democratic appointees dissented in the House decision.
According to Human Rights Research, in the United States during 2004, at least 122
foreign citizens from thirty-one countries were on death row in fourteen states and in the
federal system.' 4 In a preliminary ruling in Isasi v. Herbert,'4' Federal District Judge Jack
B. Weinstein wrote that federal courts must honor international extradition terms even in
death penalty cases. The Justice Department had, in a separate matter, asserted that it may
renege on the express condition not to seek the death penalty-an unprecedented position
given that compliance with extradition conditions is a central principle of international
law.142
2. Africa
On May 10, 2004, Amnesty International issued a report 13 surveying African countries
and finding a clear trend towards abolition of the death penalty.- In order to ease court
congestion, Rwandan President Paul Kagame proposed abolishing the death penalty for
genocide suspects transferred from Arusha, Tanzania to Rwanda for trial.14' Human rights
groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have urged Rwanda to abolish the
death penalty-including for the estimated 10,000 prisoners currently condemned to death
for participating in the 1994 genocide. 46 Pragmatic political and logistical concerns may
dictate the demise of the death penalty.'
41
In Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created in 2000 to
establish an impartial historical record and to provide a forum for both human rights victims
and perpetrators, recommended the complete abolition of the death penalty in late 2004.
However, on December 20, 2004, Freetown's High Court imposed the death penalty on
ten men convicted of treason. Amnesty International, former TRC official Howard Varney,
and others have condemned the judgments, and Varney has proposed an amendment to
138. 386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004).
139. See An Inexplicable Vote for Death, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2004, at A18.
140. See Adam Liptak, Mexico Awaits Hague Ruling on Citizens on Death Row, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2004, at
Al.
141. No. 01-CV-1804,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14740 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 16,2004).
142. See William Glaberson, Bowing to an Extradition Deal, U.S. will Forgo Death Renalty, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2004, at BI.
143. Amnesty International, Africa: Moving Towards Abolition of the Death Penalty, (May 10, 2004), at http://
news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFRO 10102004.
144. See Marc Lacey, Foes of Death Penalty Making Gradual Gains in Africa, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 20, 2004, atA3.
145. See Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Rwanda: No Death
Penalty for Indictees of UN Court, President Says (Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.irinnews.org.
146. See Esther Nakkazi, Kagame Urged to End Death Penalty, The East African, Jan. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.nationnedia.com/eastafrican/03012005/RegionaVRegionalO301200535.html.
147. See Arthur Asiimwe, Rwanda Estimates 1 Million Face Genocide Charges, available at http://www.global
policy.org/inljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2005/0114rwgencharges.htm.
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section 16(1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone to state that the right to life is inviolate
and that "no person shall be punishable by death. ' '14s
Lawyers in Uganda have challenged the death penalty in Constitutional Court on behalf
of 417 death row prisoners and have argued that fundamental rights and "freedom of a
person" set forth in articles 24 and 44(a) of the Constitution prohibit execution. 49
B. SPECIAL ISSUES IN IRAQ
Human rights advocates have raised significant concerns regarding use of evidence po-
tentially tainted by torture, conviction by less than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the
imposition of the death penalty with respect to tribunal and other legal proceedings sched-
uled to begin in 2005 against Saddam Hussein and other former Iraqi regime leaders.1 ° In
October 2004, the 2nd World Congress Against the Death Penalty in Montreal convened
and expressed opposition to the proposal for restoration of the death penalty in Iraq.'
Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein met with his defense attorney, Zaid al-Khasawneh,
in December 2004, for the first time since his capture. Hussein and eleven former senior
Baath party officials could face trial by the Iraqi Special Tribunal, established under CPA
Order No. 48, for war crimes and other offenses. Hussein's defense team includes former
U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Judge Raad al-Juhiy questioned former Iraqi senior
official Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali," and Sultan Hashim in pre-trial
investigative hearings.
The U.S. Department of Defense designated Saddam Hussein as a "prisoner of war" in
January 2004.152 As a prisoner of war, Hussein is accorded the protections of the Geneva
Conventions. Pursuant to the Third Geneva Convention to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, the United States must provide prisoners of war humane treatment, adequate housing,
sufficient food, clothing, and medical care, as well as permit visits from the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
MI. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (Court) hears hundreds of appeals every year.
The year 2004 was no exception. While the review below is admittedly somewhat selective,
it concentrates on decisions that treated important legal issues or that are likely to be
influential in the years ahead.
148. See Call for Abolition of Death Penalty, The Independent (Freetown), (Jan. I 1, 2005), available at http://
allafrica.com/stories/200501110611 html.
149. See "Death Penalty Unconstitutional," The Monitor (Kampala), (Jan. 19-20, 2005), available at http://
allafrica.com/stories/200501190752.html.
150. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) is often cited by pro-death penalty advocates as authority for the
lawfulness of both such tribunals and the legitimacy of death penalty power. In that habeas corpus petition
brought by the Japanese commanding general in the Philippines, the Supreme Court determined that the
Military Commission which tried and convicted him under the "command responsibility" doctrine for violation
of the law of war was both lawfully constituted and empowered to execute him.
151. Of course, human rights advocates are fundamentally concerned with whether these proceedings will
result in some measure of justice for the legions of victims of Saddam's murderous regime.
152. Gerry J. Gilmore, Officials call Saddam a POW but Say Status Could Change, American Forces Press
Service, Jan. 10, 2004, available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/archive/2004-01/2004011 0.html.
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A. TURKEY
Turkey has recently ramped up its campaign for acceptance into the European Union
(EU). Turkey's effort to join the EU is not new; rather, its urgency may derive from the
recent accession of ten countries from the former Warsaw Pact. While the EU grows
eastward, Turkey remains outside its bounds. Perhaps the most intractable obstacle to Tur-
key's membership is the country's perennially poor human rights record. Turkey is typically
represented on the Court's docket by a disproportionately high number of cases. Although
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is administered and adjudicated sep-
arately from the governing organs of the EU, all the EU states have ratified the ECHR.
Turkey's experience suggests that a country's performance under the ECHR can affect its
chances as a candidate for EU membership.
Moreover, with the EU's adoption of the Treaty on the European Constitution (Consti-
tution), observance of basic human rights will become a prerequisite for EU membership.'53
An intrinsic component of the new Constitution is the Charter for Human Rights (Charter).
The Charter closely conforms to the ECHR and is officially described as reflecting the
national constitutional traditions of the individual member states.14 The Constitution spec-
ifies how the governance of the EU itself will become more democratic, as a parallel to the
democratic processes recognized by each member state. Hence, Turkey's challenge is to
assure the EU of its adherence to democratic principles and its protection of human rights.
Many of the complaints brought against the Turkish government under the ECHR in
2004 developed from cases heard in Turkish national courts in the early and mid-1990s.
The applications to the Court almost invariably charged the Turkish government with a
particular, characteristic range of human rights violations. The articles of the ECHR most
frequently in these cases cited are: article 2 (the right to life), article 3 (the right to be
protected against degrading punishment or torture), article 5 (the right to be free of un-
justified detention), article 6, § 1 (the right to a fair and public judicial hearing), article 8
(the right to protection of family integrity and safety), 5' article 10 (right to freedom of
expression), and article 1 of Protocol 1 (the preservation of personal property). For example,
applicants to the Court often charged the Turkish military and internal security with killing
or torturing of civilians who had allegedly participated in political opposition movements.
The victims were commonly held in detention for indefinite periods, while their families
would be displaced from their homes. In 2004, the Court found in favor of the applicants
in the great majority of cases it heard.
While there is, of course, no typical case, a number of the most typical ECHR violations
are reflected in Feridun Yazar et al. v. Turkey.'16 The four plaintiffs in Yazar had together
founded the People's Labor Party (HEP) years before. As a result of speeches they made
at party congresses in 1991 and 1992, the plaintiffs were arrested by the police and con-
153. The twenty-five member nations adopted the Treaty on June 18, 2004 and signed it on October 29. It
now awaits formal ratification by the national governments, following each country's constitutional procedures.
154. The formal effort to compose the Charter dates from 1999, with the formation of a special commission,
led by former German President Roman Herzog that was authorized by the European Council. For a recent
review of the history and status of the Charter of Human Rights, see Thomas Schmitz, Die Grundrecktecharta
als Tel der Verfassung der europaeische Union, 5 Europarecht 691ff (Sept.-Oct. 2004).
155. Article 8 has historically been applied broadly, to include the abduction of a spouse of the displacement
of a family from its home).
156. Feridun Yazar v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42713/98 (Sept. 24, 2004).
SUMMER 2005
538 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
victed, in a security court, of a variety of offenses against the state. They all received sen-
tences varying between one and two years incarceration. In their appeal to the Court, the
four plaintiffs charged the Turkish government with violations of article 10. While their
speeches had challenged government policies, they had not been overtly insurrectionary
and violent. In addition, the panel of judges who had presided over their hearing in the
security court had included at least one military judge. They therefore also alleged a trans-
gression of article 6, § I because they had been deprived of a fair hearing in an impartial
court. The Court found for the plaintiffs on both counts. Specifically, it held that the
plaintiffs had been improperly compelled to answer criminal charges in a military tribunal
that was inherently neither independent nor impartial.
Many of the appeals against Turkey involved killings and abuse during detention; in this
sense, azar was perhaps one of the milder cases the Court decided in 2004. The victims
behind numerous applications filed with the Court have historically been either Kurdish
or affiliated with some other distinct ethnic population in Turkey. Security forces tradi-
tionally charge the victims with subversive participation in independence or leftist political
activities. Along with violent treatment, the accused have often undergone judicial processes
of questionable integrity. Thus, as in Yazar, the Court had occasion in 2004 to repeatedly
reprove the Turkish justice system for the inappropriate use of security courts to try
civilians.157
One of the Court's rulings involving Turkey will likely have significant ramifications for
other European countries. The applicant was a female Turkish medical student at the Uni-
versity of Istanbul who regularly wore a headscarf to class, in conformity with her view of
157. Among the cases decided in 2004 where the Court determined the Turkish government responsible
for violations of the ECHR were: Tekdag v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 27699/96 (Jan. 1, 2004); Ipek v. Turkey,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 25760/94 (Feb. 17, 2004); Nuray Sen v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25354/94 (Mar. 30, 2004); Tahsin
Acar v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 26307/95 (Apr. 8, 2004); Altun v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 24561/94 (Jun. 1, 2004);
Bad et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33097/96 and 57834/00 (Jun. 3, 2004); Dogan and Keser v. Turkey, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 50193/99 and 50197/99 (Jun. 24, 2004); Kaya et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 54335/00 (Jun. 24,
2004); Murat Yilmaz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 48992/99 (Jun. 24, 2004); Dogan et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.
8803-8811/02, 8813/02, and 8815-8819/02 (Jun. 29, 2004); Erkek v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28637/95 (Jul. 13,
2004); Zarakolu et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 26971/95 and 37933/97 (Jul. 13, 2004); Yuksel v. Turkey, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 40154/98 (Jul. 20, 2004); Agdas v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 34592/97 (Jul. 27, 2004); Ikincisoyv. Turkey,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 26144/95 (Jul. 27, 2004); A. et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 30015/96 (Jul. 27, 2004); Yazar et
al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42713/98 (Sept. 23, 2004); Kulic v. Turkey, Eur. Ct H.R. 40498/98 (Sept. 30,2004);
Yilmaz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42552/98 (Oct. 7, 2004); Varli et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38586/97 (Oct.
19, 2004); Doganer v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 49283/99 (Oct. 21, 2004); Celik and Imret v. Turkey, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 44093/98 (Oct. 26, 2004); Doner v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 34498/97 (Oct. 26, 2004); Zengin v. Turkey,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 46928/99 (Oct. 28, 2004); Epozdemir v. Turkey Eur. Ct. H.R. 43926/98 (Oct. 28, 2004); Kaymaz
et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 57758/00 (Oct. 28, 2004); Seyhan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33384/96 (Nov. 2,
2004); Abdulsamet Yaman v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 32446/96 (Nov. 2, 2004); Ayse Ozturk v. Turkey, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 59244/99 (Nov. 4, 2004); Taydas and Ozer v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 48805/99 (Nov. 4, 2004); Hazan
Ilhan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 22494/93 (Nov. 9, 2004); Ayhan v. Turkey, Nos. 1 and 2, Eur. Ct. H.R. 45585/
99 and 49059/99 (Nov. 10, 2004); Baran v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 48988/99 (Nov. 10, 2004); Odabasi v. Turkey,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 41618/98 (Nov. 10, 2004); Dicle v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 40395/98 (Nov. 10, 2004); Kalin v.
Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 31236/96 (Nov. 10, 2004); Canevi et al. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 40395/98 (Nov. 10,
2004); Unal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 48616/98 (Nov. 10, 2004); Volkan Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 54501/
00 (Nov. 10, 2004); A.K. and VK. v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38418/97 (Nov. 30, 2004); Gumusten v. Turkey,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 47116/99 (Nov. 30, 2004); Ozkaya v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42119/98 (Nov. 30, 2004); Sahin-
dogan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 54545/00 (Nov. 30, 2004); Metin Yilmaz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 45733/99
(Dec. 22, 2004); Sehmus Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 40297/98 (Dec. 22, 2004).
VOL. 39, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 539
correct Islamic practice.' University authorities insisted that Sahin dispense with her head
covering while attending courses on campus. She demurred and persisted in wearing the
scarf, until the university eventually banned her from continuing with her studies. Sahin's
complaint before the Court charged that the university officials had hindered her freedom
to follow her religious beliefs, as guaranteed under ECHR article 2. She further argued
that the university administration had violated her rights under article 14 by forcing her to
choose between her right to an education and her right to observe her faith. She additionally
relied on articles 8 and 10.
The Court sided with the university's insistent secularism. Side stepping the delicacies
of the doctrinal dispute of whether Islam requires women to cover their heads in public,
the Court assumed arguendo that Sahin's interpretation of the requirements of Islam was
correct: Turkish law had indeed interfered with her free exercise of religion. Nonetheless,
the Court balanced the state's interests in civil stability against the individual's right to
unfettered religious observance and ruled against Sahin. It held that the Turkish law was
both internally consistent and sufficiently in conformity with the ECHR to stand. In reach-
ing its decision, the Court deferred to previous rulings by the Turkish Constitutional Court
which had upheld the government's need to root democracy in a vigilant secularism. Most
Turkish citizens, the Court noted, considered themselves Muslim but were simultaneously
secular in their daily activities. The contested law restricting religious dress in public pre-
served this prevalent secularism, abetted the government's goal of equality among the sexes,
and discouraged religious divisiveness between students. As the ban applied uniformly to
all religions represented in Turkish society-no one was permitted to wear overt religious
garments at the university-it was not discriminatory. In short, the Court agreed that the
university's suppression of public religious expression, such as the donning of headscarves,
actually promoted students' freedom by proscribing potentially oppressive and contentious
customs.
One might reason that the ECHR exists precisely to preserve individual rights-among
them, the explicit right to religious freedom -against an overmatch of state power. But the
Court here may have had its eye on its own future docket. In the fall of 2003, the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, the German Constitutional Court, ruled on a law from Baden-Wirttemberg
that, like the Turkish regulation, barred Muslim women from wearing head scarves in
school." 9 The German Court's holding was more equivocal than that of the European
Court, but its effect and reasoning were much the same: the state may legitimately dis-
courage the public expression of religion, particularly religious symbols, if these symbols
are thought threatening to the civil peace. France, too, has contended with similar laws,
applying similar justifications. One of the concomitant arguments is that the headscarf, in
particular, is demeaning to women. The common line of argument thus casts the legal
suppression of religious freedom as a protection of other individual rights as well as social
goals. The state's duty is to cultivate equality among all its citizens, even when this mission
conflicts with the tenets of a sub-community.
158. Sahin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 44774/98 (Jun. 26, 2004). The Court also heard a similar case from by
a woman who was a nursing student at a Turkish university. Zeynep Tekin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 41556/98
(Jun. 29, 2004). However, the complainant in that case withdrew her application before the Court in February
2003 before final adjudication.
159. Urteil des BVerfG, 2BvR1436/02,Jun. 3, 2003.
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B. CZECH REPUBLIC
If not altogether surprising, it is nevertheless striking how the two most notorious Eu-
ropean totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century remain consequential for the Court in
the twenty-first. A fairly frequent type of appeal heard by the Court concerns the loss of
property through state expropriation. The plaintiff in Karasova v. Czech Republic had sued
the Czech government in 1990 for failing to return her family land, originally seized during
the Nazi occupation and subsequently retained by the Communist administration.110 While
the Czech court did ultimately award Karasova half of the property, the legal proceedings
lasted nearly ten years. She therefore appealed to the Court under article 6, § 1 for loss of
enjoyment of her property because of the excessive delay in judicial resolution. The Court
(noting that its jurisdiction extended retroactively only to March 1992, the date the Czech
Republic ratified the ECHR) held for the plaintiff and ordered the Czech government to
recompense Karasova financially for the unreasonable delay.
C. RussiA
From Russia, the Court heard the appeal of a plaintiff whose family home had been
expropriated by the Soviet government after the plaintiff's father suddenly fell out of official
favor in 1930.161 Soviet authorities rehabilitated the paterfamilias posthumously in 1989,
prompting the plaintiff to reclaim the land in 1992. Hearings in the Russian courts carried
on for six years. In its ruling, the Court found for the applicant, writing that the process
had been unduly protracted in violation of article 6, § 1 and that the applicant had been
deprived of an apposite remedy in violation of article 13.
D. POLAND
The Court likewise ruled for the complainants in Zynger v. Poland, where a family prop-
erty had been expropriated by the state in the absence of the family.162 The Zyngers had
emigrated from Poland to Israel in 1948, but were not granted a visa so they could oppose
the seizure of their property in 1965. As in Yemanakova, the Court awarded the plaintiffs
compensation for violations of articles 6, § 1 and 13.
E. CROATIA
The violence in the region of Croatia that had raged throughout the 1990s included the
purposeful destruction of homes and farms, and in many instances, the murder of their
inhabitants. The Court considered a number of cases stemming from these events. The
aggrieved parties charged that the Croatian national courts and the legislature had inten-
tionally and methodically denied them redress by unreasonable prevarications and statutory
hindrances. A good portion of them were resolved through friendly settlement, preempting
the Court's final ruling. Where the Court did reach decisions, it held for the plaintiffs in
finding violations of Article 6, § 1.163
160. Karasova v. Czech Republic, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71545/01 (Nov. 30, 2004).
161. Yemanakova v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60408/00 (Sept. 23, 2004).
162. Zynger v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 66096/01 (Jul. 13, 2004).
163. Freimann v. Croatia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 5266/02 (Jun. 24, 2004); Dragovic v. Croatia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 5705/
02 (Oct. 28, 2004).
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F. UNITED KINGDOM
In Hirst v. United Kingdom, the Court overturned a statutory restriction on voting rights
that had been in force in England for over twenty years. 64 The applicant had been convicted
of manslaughter, and under the Representation of the People Act of 1983, he was therefore
permanently disallowed from voting in either parliamentary or local elections. The Court
acknowledged that sovereign states have wide latitude to decree voting eligibility, but it
held conclusively against the government under Article 3 of Protocol 1, finding that there
was no proven correlation between the denial of the right to vote and the deterrence of
crime. Moreover, the superfluous deprivation of civil rights hampered rehabilitation, an
express goal of the country's penology. Preventing prisoners and former prisoners from
voting only alienated them from the society into which they were to be reintegrated. Worse
still, the Act applied regardless of the length of the sentence or the severity of the crime.
The Representation of the People Act, the Court suggested, reflected historical prejudices
against convicted criminals rather than knowledge of a real social risk. Approximately
70,000 prisoners and former prisoners in Great Britain were currently affected by the law.
The Court ruled for Hirst.
G. EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW INVOLVING RoMA
Europe's Roma population, thought to number up to 8.5 million across Europe,' t6 has
long suffered from hostility, discrimination, unemployment, and abject poverty. In 2004,
however, several encouraging court decisions from both domestic and international bodies
in favor of Roma applicants instill hope that European courts are finally willing to address
the myriad of human rights and social issues facing this long-ignored group.
Perhaps the most important decision was issued by the Court on February 26, 2004, in
the case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria.'66 For the first time in the Court's fifty-year
history, it found a violation of article 14 (discrimination) based on racial grounds. The case
involved two young Romani men who had gone missing from the Bulgarian Army and were
hiding at a relative's house in a small village in the Bulgarian mountains. When the military
police arrived looking for the two men, they fled the house where they were hiding and
began to run down the hill. The police opened fire, killing both of them. A subsequent
investigation by Bulgarian authorities exonerated the officers, finding they had acted ap-
propriately to prevent escape. Evidence in the case showed that the sergeant in charge,
when asked why he had fired an automatic weapon in an inhabited area, responded that it
was in the "gypsy" part of town. The Court found a violation of article 2 (right to life) and
of article 14 (discrimination) arising from the failure of the Bulgarian authorities to inves-
tigate whether or not "discriminatory attitudes may have played a role in events."
67
Prior to the Nachova case, the Court had applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof to article 14 claims. For example, in its decision issued June 13, 2002, inAnguelova
v. Bulgaria, involving the death of a young Romani man while in police custody, the Court,
while accepting that the applicant had raised serious arguments that the treatment by the
164. Hirst v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 74025/01 (Mar. 30, 2004).
165. Jean-Pierre Liegeois, Roma, Gypsies, Travellers 34 (1994).
166. Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 43577/98 and 43579/98 (Feb. 26, 2004).
167. Nachova et al v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 43577/98 & 43579/98 (2004).
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police was a result of his Romani ethnicity, reiterated that the applicant had not shown
discrimination beyond a reasonable doubt.6 ' In a thoughtful dissenting opinion, Judge
Bonello of Malta noted, "[f]requently and regularly the Court acknowledges that members
of vulnerable minorities are deprived of life or subjected to appalling treatment in violation
of article 3, [freedom from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment], but not once has
the Court found that this happens to be linked to their ethnicity. Kurds, coloreds, Muslims,
Roma, and others are again and again killed, tortured or maimed, but the Court is not
persuaded that their race, color, nationality or place of origin has anything to do with it." 69
The primary basis of the Court's ruling was that "when investigating violent incidents
and, in particular, deaths at the hands of State agents, State authorities have the additional
duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or
not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events." 170 Otherwise, "treating
racially induced violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist
overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly
destructive of fundamental rights."'' The Bulgarian government has appealed the decision
to the Grand Chamber, with a hearing scheduled for the spring of 2005. Numerous human
rights organizations, including the Open Society Institute's Justice Initiative, have filed
amicus briefs.
The House of Lords, on December 9, 2004, overturned a British Court of Appeal de-
cision finding that discrimination against Roma with respect to travel to the United King-
dom was justified because of their likely status as asylum seekers.I" Beginning in 2001, in
an effort to stem the tide of Romani asylum applicants fleeing to the United Kingdom from
the Czech Republic, the U.K. government entered into an agreement with Czech author-
ities to place immigration officers at the Prague airport to pre-screen all passengers traveling
to the United Kingdom. Almost 90 percent of the passengers who were refused passage
were Roma, while less than 1 percent of non-Roma were denied.'73 The appellants, rep-
resented by the U.K. human rights organization Liberty, argued the procedures were in-
compatible with the United Kingdom's obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and under customary international law and involved
unjustifiable discrimination on racial grounds.
The British High Court held the practice did not discriminate against Roma. On appeal
in a two to one decision, the Court of Appeal determined that the practice did discriminate
against Roma, but that the discrimination was justified because the Roma were more likely
to seek asylum. Both lower courts dismissed the Geneva Convention claim. However, while
the House of Lords also rejected the Geneva Convention claim, it found the practice con-
stituted unlawful discrimination on racial grounds contrary to the Race Relations Act of
1976. The Law Lords held that the practice also violated several international conventions,
including the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
168. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38361/97 (2002).
169. Id.
170. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38361/97 (Jun. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
171. Id.
172. Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma
Rights Centre and others (Appellants), [20041 UKHL 55 (on file with author).
173. Statistics compiled by the European Roma Rights Center. The Center's website is at http://www.
errc.org.
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as customary international
law. Lord Steyn stated, "[t]he moral norm [of nondiscrimination on grounds of race] has
ripened into a rule of customary international law. It is binding on all states."'7 4 The decision
highlights that states do not enjoy unfettered discretion in terms of the border policies,
legislation, and practices.'75 The impact of this decision on the United Kingdom and other
European Union countries with respect to immigration, a current political firestorm, re-
mains to be seen.
76
The Court, in the case of Balogh v. Hungary (July 21, 2004), and the U.N. Committee
Against Torture, in the case of Dimitrijevic v. Serbia (November 24, 2004), both found
violations of article 3 of the ECHR and Article 2 taken together with articles 1, 12, 13, and
14 of the Convention against Torture with respect to acts of brutality against Roma while
in police custody.' In the Balogh case, Balogh was interrogated for several hours at the
police station regarding alleged stolen fuel vouchers, resulting in serious damage to his left
ear drum. Dimitrijevic was arrested in connection with a criminal investigation, handcuffed
to a radiator and beaten severely. He was released without charges four and a half hours
later. Despite the filing of a criminal complaint by Dimitrijevic and numerous attempts to
secure an investigation of the incident, local authorities never responded. In addition to
finding that Dimitrijevic had been subjected to torture, the Committee also found Serbia
to be in violation of its obligation to carry out a prompt investigation of the complaint,
which also deprived the victim of the possibility of pursuing a civil suit for compensation.
In 2003, Bulgaria passed comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation which came into
force on January 1, 2004, and complies with the requirements of the European Union Race
Equality Directive (which took effect in EU member states in July 2003). Pursuant to that
legislation, five Bulgarian courts issued judgments in favor of Romani applicants claiming
discrimination. These cases are significant with respect to human rights jurisprudence be-
cause discrimination is only recently being recognized as an offense in formerly Communist
countries, many of which still lack appropriate legislation. All five judgments were issued
by the Sofia District Court and are but a handful of domestic court judgments in Eastern
Europe recognizing discrimination claims.'78
The cases of Nanova v. VALI Ltd, decided July 9, 2004, involved discrimination in access
by a Romani woman to a clothing shop.19 Grigorov v. Sofia Electric Company, decidedJuly 12,
2004, involved the state-owned electric company's refusal to connect the plaintiff's house
to the electricity network unless he agreed to put the electrical meter pole nine meters high
to prevent other Roma from connecting to the power supply. In a case involving similar
facts, Kochev v. Sofia Electric Company, decided August 6, 2004, the court applied the new
law's provision on shifting the burden of proof to the respondent, even though the case
was filed prior to entry into force of the new law.
174. Regina, [20041 UKHL 55.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Balogh v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. 47940/99 (Jul. 20, 2004); UN Committee Against Torture, Dimi-
trijevic case (on file with author).
178. European Roma Rights Centre, Strategic Litigation Undertaken by the ERRC and Local Partners
Prompt Bulgarian Courts to Sanction Racial Discrimination Against Roma, available at http://www.ercc.org/
cikk.phpcikk = 2070.
179. Nanova v. VALI Ltd., Sofia Dist. Ct. 1969/2004 (Jul. 23, 2004).
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V. Women's Rights
A. AFRICA
The year 2004 saw positive transformations in women's rights in Africa. This section will
focus on the following issues: (1) the introduction of forced marriage as a war crime in
Sierra Leone; (2) a constitutional challenge to the rule of male primogeniture in South
Africa, (3) a constitutional challenge to adultery provisions in Uganda's divorce laws, (4) a
Sharia court's response to an adultery allegation in Nigeria, and (5) Ethiopia's decision to
set aside seats in parliament to increase women participation by women. While these are
just a few examples of the strides being made in the area of women's rights, they provide
examples from West Africa, South Africa and East Africa.
1. Sierra Leone
It is estimated that thousands of women were forced to become "bush wives" during the
decade long civil war in Sierra Leone. Reacting to these atrocities, in early 2004, David
Crane, Special Prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone (Special Court) took a
bold step to amend the pending indictments at the Special Court to include the crime of
"forced marriage.""' On May 6, 2004, the Trial Chamber granted leave for the amendment
thereby adding an eighteenth charge of "Crimes against humanity-other inhumane acts
(forced marriage)" to the consolidated indictments for the RUF and the AFRC. s' The
inclusion of forced marriage as a crime against humanity sets an important precedent in
international law for criminalizing abuse of women and sexual crimes during armed conflict.
Forced marriage is not the same as sexual enslavement. Forced marriage is a system of
abuse that includes sexual enslavement as well as abduction and rape. These "wives" were
abducted during the war and forced to have sex with their "husbands" and bear them
children. "Bush wives" were threatened with death if they tried to escape. They were forced
to serve their "husbands" as a wife and were viewed by other combatants as being married,
thereby protecting them from gang rape by other insurgents. They were sex slaves and
imprisoned by the community in this "marriage." The Special Prosecutor believes that
because the women were held under threat of harm or death for extremely long periods,
this crime differs from sexual enslavement or rape. 82
One source estimates that 15 percent of forced marriages were formalized with some sort
of ceremony, occasionally officiated by military commanders. Generally when a ceremony
took place, family members of the "wives," if any were living, would attend."s3 Customary
rituals such as bride price or sharing traditional dishes might even occur to further reinforce
the marriage.0 4
The marriages did not necessarily end when the war ended. Bush wives' communities
often would not accept them back because they were seen as having been part of the rebel
180. Angela Stevens, Forced Marriage Pursued as Crime in Sierra Leone Tribunal Cases, UN Wire, Apr. 16,
2004, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040416/449-_22909.asp. See also, Aminatta Forna, Back to My Shat-
tered Home, Sunday Times (London), Mar. 14, 2004.
181. All decisions by the Trial and Appellate Chambers of the Special Court are available at http://www.
sc-sl.org.
182. Stevens, supra note 180.
183. Jennifer Swallow, Brutalised Legacy, Morning Star, Jul. 10, 2004, at 9.
184. Id.
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forces. Moreover, due to cultural stigmas related to sex and marriage, it is difficult for
women, some of whom were mere children when abducted, to admit that they were raped
and forced into marriage.8 5
Forced marriage is being treated as a crime against humanity or other inhumane act.
Therefore, in order to prove the crime, the prosecution will have to prove the act was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
2. South Africa
Women and girls can now inherit under South African law. This was recognized by the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, on October 15, 2004, when it struck down the rule
of male primogeniture as applied to the customary law of succession. 18 6 While customary
law is an important part of the culture of a nation, it can no longer be used to perpetuate
the disenfranchisement of women and girls. The South African Constitutional Court noted
that customary laws "have over time become increasingly out of step with the real values
and circumstances of the societies they are meant to serve and particularly the people who
live in urban areas."' 87
Bhe had two minor daughters by Mgolombane, who died intestate. The court appointed
the deceased's father as sole heir of the deceased estate, in accordance with the law.'I s The
general custom was that only a male who was related to the deceased qualified as an intestate
heir and could inherit the family's estate. If a son does not survive the deceased, his estate
goes to his father, and if the father is deceased, then to the next closest male relative.8 9
Basing its decision on Articles 9 (equal protection) and 10 (right to dignity) of the South
African Constitution, the Court found that excluding women from inheriting on the ground
of gender is, "a form of discrimination that entrenches past patterns of disadvantage among
a vulnerable group, exacerbated by old notions of patriarchy and male domination incom-
patible with the guarantee of equality ....",90
3. Uganda
"Wives can divorce cheating husbands."' 9' This statement was announced in bold letters
on the front page of the Monitor, on March 11, 2004.192 The headline represents a major
advancement in women's rights in Uganda. On March 10, 2004, the Constitutional Court
of Uganda ordered that all grounds for divorce be available equally to both men and women
under the Divorce Act. 193 Prior to this decision, males were able to divorce their wives solely
185. Id.
186. Bhe v. Magistrate, Const. Ct. of S. Afr. CCT49/03 (Oct. 15, 2004); Shibi v. Sithole, Const. Ct. of S.
Aft. CCT69/03 (Oct. 15, 2004); S. Aft. Human Rights Comm'n v. President of the Republic of S. Aft., Const.
Ct. of S. Afr. CCT50/03 (Oct. 15, 2004).
187. Bhe, CCT49/03 at para. 82.
188. See §23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. Art.1 states, "[a]ll movable property belonging to
a Black and allotted by him or accruing under Black law or custom to any woman with whom he lived in a
customary union, or to any house, shall upon his death devolve and be administered under Black law and
custom." (emphasis added), available at www.manguorg.co.za/dbtw-wpd/temp/LegalServices/Documents/Black-
Administration-Act.pdf.
189. Bhe, CCT49/03 at para. 77.
190. Id. at para. 91.
191. Wrves Can Divorce Cheating Husbands, The Monitor, Mar. 11, 2004.
192. Id.
193. Uganda Association of Women Lawyers v. The Attorney General, Const. Ct. of Uganda at Kampala,
Constitutional Pet. No. 2 of 2004, (Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Uganda Association of Women Lawyers].
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on the grounds of adultery, whereas for a wife to petition for divorce, she would have to
prove adultery plus an additional element. 4 Moreover, women were given seven grounds
for divorce, whereas a man was only given adultery.
The Constitutional Court found these provisions to be in derogation of articles 21 (equal
protection), 31 (equal rights in marriage) and 33 (right to dignity) of the Ugandan Con-
stitution. 95 It ordered all grounds for divorce mentioned in the Divorce Act to be available
to both men and women equally. 196 In addition to rectifying a discriminatory law, the de-
cision also invalidated a rule that has been used for almost a decade as a basis for dismissing
public litigation cases. 97 This case is the first women's rights case to be heard by the Ugan-
dan Constitutional Court.
4. Nigeria
Islamic law (commonly known as Shariah) is practiced in one-third of Nigeria's provinces,
and decisions of the Shariah appellate court can be appealed to a federal intermediate
appellate court and the Nigerian Supreme Court, which are not governed by Shariah law.
In November, Nigeria's Upper Shariah Court overturned the ruling of a lower Shariah
court, sentencing a young Nigerian woman to death by stoning for adultery. The presiding
judge, Muhammad Mustapha Umar, ruled that, because the man with whom the woman
allegedly committed adultery denied that the act took place, the case should have been
dismissed, and the woman's father, who brought the case before the court, should have
been charged with slander. 9 The decision can be appealed to the Shariah Court of Appeal.
Several months earlier, a thirty-one year old woman prevailed in her appeal of a death
sentence by stoning for having committed adultery. 199 After the unmarried woman became
pregnant, her province implemented Shariah law, and she was convicted of committing
adultery with a thirty-five year old man. The Shariah Court of Appeal overturned her
sentence because Shariah law was not implemented in her province until after she became
pregnant. Despite several convictions for adultery, no stonings have yet been carried out in
Nigeria since Shariah law was implemented in several provinces in approximately 2000.10o
5. Ethiopia
Electoral developments in Africa include the October decision of the ruling party of
Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), to allocate 30 percent of
the seats to women in the new Parliament that is to be elected in May 2005.01 Ethiopia's
move is not unique in Africa. Approximately twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa have
194. These elements included: incest, bigamy, polygamy, rape, sodomy bestiality, cruelty or desertion. Sec-
tion 4(2)(b) of Chap. 249, Divorce Act, Laws of Uganda.
195. Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, Const., supra note 193, Pet. No. 2 of 2004.
196. Id.
197. The respondent's attorney submitted that the petition was time barred by Article 273 of the Consti-
tution. The argument is that all claims against that an existing law contravened the new Constitution had to
be filed within 30 days of the Constitution coming into force (October 8, 1995).
198. Nigerian Girl Spared Death by Stoning, Aljazeera.net, Nov. 10, 2004, at http://english.aljazeera.net/NRI
exeres/3EE585DB -DEA4-42CF-B2 22-FA750DOCB7CO.htm.
199. Jeff Koinange, Woman Sentenced to Stoning Freed, CNN, Feb. 23, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/africa/09/25/nigeria.stoning/.
200. Nigerian Girl Spared Death by Stoning, supra note 198.
201. Cathy Majtenyi, African Parliaments Opening Doors to Women, Voice of America, Nov. 17,2004, athttp:II
www.voanews.com/english/2004-11-17-voa49.cfm.
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implemented quotas for women's participation, bringing the parliamentary representation
of women to 14.5 percent-just below the world average of 15.5 percent. 202 Rwanda leads
the world in the percentage of women-49 percent--represented in parliament, 03 and the
parliaments of South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia all are among the top twenty-four




In December, Pakistan's Senate passed a law increasing the maximum allowable punish-
ment for honor killings (i.e., the killing of a woman by her relatives for allegedly violating
social norms, such as having an extramarital affair, being a victim of rape, or marrying
without her family's permission 0S) to life imprisonment or death, and setting a minimum
punishment of ten years in prison. 06 A similar bill had been passed in October by Pakistan's
lower house of parliament.207 The harsher punishments had long been promoted by human
rights and women's rights advocates, hundreds of whom had demonstrated outside of Pa-
kistan's parliament on October to protest Pakistan's inaction on the issue.200 The final bill,
however, angered activists by failing to ban the practice of the murder reaching out-of-
court settlements with the victims' families. 09 Many Pakistani politicians walked out of the
Senate session in protest of the bill's limited scope, fearing that it would allow the wealthy
to intimidate victims' families and thus to buy their freedom. The version of the bill passed
by the lower house had discouraged such settlements by barring them from being entered
into before or during trial.2'0 Despite her reservations about the bill, Zobaida Jalal, Paki-
stan's minister for social welfare and special education, and the country's only female cabinet
minister, called the bill "an achievement as a first step," and noted that judges will be left
to decide whether to allow compensation to the victims' families in return for pardons. 2"
The bill was signed into law by Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, in January,
2005. 212 An estimated 1,200 women were murdered in Pakistan in honor killings in 2004;
in recent years the ratio of killers acquitted for such crimes has been 80 percent.2"'




205. A Voice for tustice, Annual Report 2000, Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org/annual-report/
2000/justice4.html.
206. Raja Asghar, Senate Passes Honour Killing Bill, Dawn, Dec. 8, 2004, at http://www.dawn.com/2004/12/
08/topl.hun.
207. "Honour Killings" Law Tightened, BBC News, Oct. 26, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
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2. Afghanistan
In 2004, Afghanistan adopted a constitution proclaiming that women are to be accorded
"equal rights and duties before the law.1214 The constitution also charged the state with
"implement[ing] effective programs for balancing and promoting of education for women."-215
In October 2004, women, together with their male counterparts, voted in national elections.
According to statistics, approximately 40 percent of the registered voters were women;
however, women make up two-thirds of the Afghani population, and in some parts of the
country only 10 percent of the registered voters were women.2 16 Despite some notable gains
for women's rights in Afghanistan in 2004, many Afghani women report that they continue
to feel unsafe."7 Their fears are not unfounded. In just one of many examples, inJune 2004,
a bomb targeted a bus full of women election workers in Eastern Afghanistan, killing three
and injuring a dozen others."'
C. EUROPE
1. Turkey
In November [insert year], the Court ruled that Turkey had violated articles 8 and 14 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by re-
quiring a married woman to take her husband's surname.2t 9 Ayten Unal Tekeli alleged that
a Turkish law requiring women to bear their husband's family name throughout their mar-
ried life had unjustifiably interfered with her right to protection of her private life, and that
it was discriminatory against women because only married men, not married women, were
permitted to retain their family name after marriage.220 At the time of her marriage the
woman took her husband's name, but continued to use her maiden name in her professional
life. However, she was unable to use both her maiden surname and her husband's surname
together on official documents. Her attempts to use only her maiden name were rejected
by two Turkish courts.22 The Turkish Government argued before the Court that the dif-
ferent treatment between men and women on the grounds of sex was based on objective
and reasonable grounds, namely, that there was a link between family unity and a family
name, family unity was a public policy consideration, and an individual's private life ceased
when entering into contract with public life. Turkey went on to argue that because nearly
70 percent of Turkish women had "very limited economic freedom," the requirement that
both spouses take the husband's last name was an attempt to strengthen the wife's position
in the family.22 Finally, Turkey pointed to the administrative difficulties in maintaining
birth, marriage and death records that might be caused by allowing for spouses to have
214. Afg. Const., art. 22.
215. Afg. Const., art. 44.
216. Afghanistan's Presidential Election, CBC News, Oct. 12, 2004, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/
afghanistan/afghanelection.hunl.
217. Between Hope and Fear, Intimidation and Attack Against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan, A Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Oct. 2004, at 11.
218. Id.
219. Unal Tekeli v. Turkey App. No. 29865/96, European Court of Human Rights (Nov. 16, 2004), available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htn.
220. Id. at 1.
221. Id. at 2-3.
222. Id. at 12.
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different surnames.223 In rejecting Turkey's arguments, the Court held that "the obligation
on married women, in the name of family unity, to bear their husband's surname ... has
no objective and reasonable justification. '224 It went on to state that "society may reasonably
be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and
worth in accordance with the name they have chosen."22
D. MIDDLE EAST
1. Saudi Arabia
Following months of speculation that women would be permitted to vote and stand as
candidates in Saudi Arabia's first national election scheduled to be held between February
and April 2005, the country's Interior Minister, Prince Nayef, announced in October that
women would again be denied participation.226 The government claimed that there were
insufficient numbers of women available for running the gender-segregated polling centers,
and that not enough women possessed photo identification cards, which are legally required
to vote in the election.227 Three women had declared themselves candidates for election
following the publication of a Saudi election law in August 2004, which did not explicitly
bar women from voting or running for office.22 Only a few other countries in the world,
including Brunei and Kuwait, continue to deny women suffrage rights, though the Kuwaiti
Cabinet approved a bill in 2004, signed by the Kuwaiti emir, that would grant women the
right to vote if the bill is passed by the Parliament.22 9 A similar effort failed in 1999.230
2. Iran
In Iran, the former reformist-led parliament passed a bill in May 2004, granting women
inheritance rights equal to those of men.231 Iran's Guardian Council failed to approve the
bill, just as it has done with similar reform bills in the past. The bill would have allowed a
woman to inherit her husband's entire estate if there were no other heirs. Currently, a
woman is entitled to receive only one-fourth to one-eighth of her husband's estate. The
new Iranian parliament rejected the inheritance bill, and has taken steps to place further
restrictions on women's rights, including calling for segregation between women and men
at colleges and universities.232
223. Id.
224. Id. at 15-16.
225. Id. at 17.
226. CBS News, Saudi Women Barred From Voting (Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/10/12/world/main648787.shtml.
227. Ms. Magazine, Women Officially Banned from Voting, Running for Offise in Saudi Arabia (Oct. 12, 2004)
available at http://www.msmagazine.com/news/uswirestory.asp?id = 8682.
228. Saudi Women Barred From Voting, supra note 226.
229. Arab News, Vote fr Women: Kuwait Moves a Step Closer (Oct. 27, 2004), at http://www.arabnews.coml
?page =4&section = 0&article= 53525&d =27&m = 10&y = 2004.
230. Christian Science Monitor, Kuwaiti Women Seek Right to Vote (Aug. 8, 2000), available at http:/I
www.csmonitor.com/atcsmonitor/specials/women/rights/rights08O800.htnl.
231. Ms. Magazine, Iran s Parliament Approves Bill Granting Women Equal Inheritance Rights (May 20, 2004),
available at http://www.msmagazine.com/news/uswirestory.asp?id = 8459
232. Nazila Fathi, Iran Moves to Roll Back Rights Won By Women, Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom (Sept. 19, 2004), at http://www.peacewomen.org/news/Iran/SeptO4/rollbackrights.html.
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3. Morocco
Following over a decade of reform efforts, both houses of the Moroccan parliament
unanimously adopted a revised version of the Moroccan Family Code, known as the Mu-
dawwana. The new legislation, adopted in January 2004, includes significant changes to the
rights of women in marriage, divorce, and child custody. Specialized family courts will
operate within the court system to implement the revised code.
The revised code raises the legal minimum age of marriage for girls from fifteen to
eighteen years old and adopts the principle of divorce by mutual consent, which subjects
repudiation of a marriage by either spouse to a court ruling, and invalidates verbal repu-
diation by the husband. A husband must pay all money owed to his wife and children before
registration of the divorce. The revisions recognize the right of a woman to custody of her
children even if she remarries, relocates from where her husband resides, or the reason for
her loss of custody ceases. A woman may request a divorce on the grounds of wrongs
suffered if her husband takes a second wife. The code also requires a judge to authorize a
man's marriage to a second wife by determining that the man has the ability to equitably
provide for both wives.
E. THE UNITED STATES
The main case affecting women's rights decided by United States Supreme Court in
2004 ruled that workers may sue their former employers after leaving their jobs due to
intolerable sexual harassment. In the case of Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, a former
employee of the Pennsylvania State Police barracks, Nancy Drew Suders, sought redress
from being subject to sexually charged posturing, leering and remarks at the hands of three
male supervisors. 33 Suders, who worked as a communications officer, experienced ongoing
sexual harassment from her male supervisors, and reported the harassment to the depart-
ment's Equal Opportunity Officer. Suders resigned shortly afterward and filed a sexual
harassment claim against her former employer. The Supreme Court held that an employee
who has been sexually harassed may bring a claim against a former employer after a con-
structive discharge-quitting a job as a reasonable response to intolerable working condi-
tions. In prior sexual harassment cases, the Court had ruled that employers could be held
strictly liable when sexual harassment by a supervisor resulted in a "tangible" employment
action, such as the employee's being fired, demoted, or transferred to an undesirable po-
sition.234 The Court went on to hold that in cases involving a constructive discharge, em-
ployers may affirmatively defend against such charges by demonstrating that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior and that the harassed
employee failed to take reasonable advantage of the employers' systems for reporting sexual
harassment.3
V. Israel and the Occupied Territories
There were several key developments internationally in 2004 regarding the application
of international human rights and humanitarian norms in Israel and the Occupied Terri-
233. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
234. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); accord Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
235. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 768.
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tories. Of particular note was the issuance of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.2 3 6 The matter
was referred to the Court by the U.N. General Assembly, which on December 8, 2003
asked the Court to consider,
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and prin-
ciples of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?2"
By January 30, 2004, the Court had received forty-eight written statements from the
United Nations, U.N. member states, Palestine, the League of Arab States, and the Or-
ganisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). These submissions raised both substantive legal
and procedural matters. The public hearings began on February 23, 2004, and lasted for
three days. During these days, the ICJ heard oral statements from Palestine, the League of
Arab States, the OIC and twelve U.N. member states. The State of Israel declined to
participate in these public hearings, taking the position that the ICJ was not an appropriate
forum for discussion of the issue. Israeli officials, however, submitted a 130-page written
document detailing their position that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction, and thus should
not hear the case. 38
Four months later, the ICJ announced that on July 9, 2004, it would issue its Advisory
Opinion on this matter.239 In the opinion, the judges agreed that the ICJ had jurisdiction
to hear the matter and agreed to comply with the referral. In their nearly unanimous de-
cision, they found: (1) the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(OPT) and its associated regime are contrary to international law; (2) Israel must stop its
breaches of international law, cease the Wall's construction in the OPT, dismantle the Wall
constructed thus far in the OPT, and undo all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto;
(3) Israel must make reparation for all damage caused by the Wall's construction in the
OPT; (4) States must not recognize the illegal situation resulting from the Wall's construc-
tion and provide neither aid nor assistance in maintaining the situation created by its con-
struction, and all High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention must ensure
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in the Convention;
and (5) the United Nations should consider what further action is required to bring to an
end the illegal situation resulting from the Wall's construction.
24°
In addition to these points from the dispositif, there were a number of key legal assertions
made within the context of the opinion. The ICJ maintained that the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, should remain occupied in accordance with Article 42 of the Regulations
236. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International
Court of Justice (9 July 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/idjwww/idcket/imwp/impframe.htm.
237. G.A. Res.ES-10/14, (Dec. 8, 2003).
238. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpstatements/iWrittenStatement-17-Israel.
pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
239. ICJ Press Release 2004/23, The Court Will Render Its Advisory Opinion on Friday 9July 2004, at 3
P.M., (June 25, 2004).
240. U.N. Report on Darfur, supra note 10, at 46.
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Annexed to the Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land.14l In addition, the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War is applicable to the West Bank.2 42 Similarly, the ICJ stated that the
protections offered by human rights conventions do not end once conflict begins, confirm-
ing that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable in respect of
acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory,2 43 and that
Israel is also bound by the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in its activities in the
West Bank.2 4
The context of the Advisory Opinion contains two other key points. First, the ICJ con-
sidered the matter of Israeli settlements in the OPT, finding that they were established in
breach of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.14 Additionally, it held that the
construction of the Wall and its associated regime in the OPT create afait accompli on the
ground which could become permanent. Should this situation become permanent in nature,
the ICJ added, it would be tantamount to defacto annexation.2 46
On July 20, 2004, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution ES-10/15, 247 acknowl-
edging the ICJ Advisory Opinion and demanding that Israel comply with its legal obliga-
tions as outlined therein. Although Israel to date has rejected the legal authority of the ICJ
Advisory Opinion, it is worth noting that the Israeli High Court of Justice asked the State
to prepare a position paper on the impact of the opinion.
The question of the application of international human rights law by Israeli authorities
was also raised in 2004. In August 2004, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) considered the legality of Israel's Nationality and
Entry Into Israel Law (Law) under its early warning and urgent procedures. The Law
prohibits the granting of either residency or citizenship status to any Palestinian from the
OPT who married an Israeli citizen. Article 2 of the Law specifically states,
During the period in which this Law shall be in effect, notwithstanding the provisions of any
law, including section 7 of the Nationality Law, the Minister of Interior shall not grant a
resident of the region [the OPT] nationality pursuant to the Nationality Law and shall not
give a resident of the region a permit to reside in Israeli pursuant to the Entry into Israel Law.
The regional commander shall not give such resident a permit to stay in Israel pursuant to the
defence legislation in the region. 48
Based on the main elements of a Cabinet Decision passed in May 2002, the Law was
originally enacted for one year by the Israeli Knesset (parliament) in July 2003. It was
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subsequently renewed for six months in July 2 004. Upon consideration the following month,
CERD noted that the Law raised "serious issues under the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. '249 The Law had previously been
the subject of concern by CERD25 and the U.N. Human Rights Committee.5 1
249. CERD, Decision 2 (65): Israel, 65th sess., CERD A/59/18 (Aug. 20, 2004).
250. CERD, Decision 2 (63): Israel, 63rd sess. CERD A/58/18 (Aug. 14, 2003).
251. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations oftse Human Rights Committee 78th sess., CCPR/
CO/78/ISR, at para. 21 (Aug. 21, 2003).
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